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THE JUDICIAL NOMINATIONS WARS
William P. Marshall *
Although there is much that divides the speakers here today,
there is one point upon which there is general agreement-the
judicial nominations process has become increasingly divisive and
is exacting a considerable toll on both the candidates and on the
process itself. Indeed, it may very well be, as Judge Jones sug-
gests, that the delays, partisanship, and acrimony currently
dominating the process are deterring some able and talented law-
yers from seeking positions in the federal judiciary.'
In part, I suspect that the current judicial nominations battles
are simply symptomatic of the broader political and cultural wars
that so deeply divide this country. The nation is split literally
down the middle between conservatives and liberals, Democrats
and Republicans, red states and blue states, and there is little
reason to expect that in this current climate the judicial nomina-
tions process should be the issue that flies below the partisan ra-
dar. Indeed, given the stakes involved, the fact that the judicial
nominations process has generated as much vitriol as it has is
anything but surprising. After all, the matters that routinely
come before the federal courts are the very issues that deeply di-
vide us. In the last few years alone, the Supreme Court has is-
sued critical rulings on such hot-button issues as gay rights,2
school vouchers,3 the environment,4 affirmative action,5 the
Pledge of Allegiance, 6 the war on terror,7 and abortion'-just to
* William R. Kenan Distinguished Professor of Law, University of North Carolina
School of Law. B.A., 1972, University of Pennsylvania; J.D., 1977, University of Chicago. I
am grateful to Lydia Jones for her excellent research assistance.
1. See Edith H. Jones, Observations on the Status and Impact of the Judicial Con-
firmation Process, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 833, 845 (2005).
2. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
3. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
4. See Alaska Dep't of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461 (2004).
5. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
6. See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. 2301 (2004).
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name a few. Judicial decisions, in short, are at the heart of our
political and cultural divisions.
The current nominations wars, however, also have their own
particular genesis apart from the broader political fray, and it is
worthwhile investigating how we got into the current morass.
Certainly, political battles about judicial selection are nothing
new. Even George Washington saw one of his nominees to the
Supreme Court, John Rutledge, go down in defeat because of the
latter's political beliefs.9 During Jefferson's presidency, Congress
escalated the political battle to even greater heights (depths) by
going so far as to impeach a sitting Supreme Court Justice, Sam-
uel Chase, for partisan reasons. 10 Chase, apparently, was thought
to be too much a Federalist for the Democratic Congress.1"
The source of our current troubles, however, likely stems from
the series of controversial decisions of the Warren Court 2 that
broadly expanded constitutional rights in the areas of church and
state, 3 criminal defense,' 4 voting rights, and reproductive
rights 6 and Roe v. Wade, 7 the most galvanizing decision of all,
decided during the early years of the Burger Court." To the con-
servatives, these opinions were an anathema-nothing more than
7. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004).
8. See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
9. Rutledge engendered opposition because of his stated objections to the Jay Treaty
of 1794. See HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES, PRESIDENTS, AND SENATORS: A HISTORY OF THE
U.S. SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENTS FROM WASHINGTON TO CLINTON 29-30 (rev. ed.
1999).
10. See, e.g., id. at 57-58.
11. See id. Although impeached by the House, Chase was acquitted by the Senate. Id.
at 58. The reason for the Senate's action, however, apparently had less to do with the high
principle of preserving judicial independence than the fact that Jefferson had apparently
alienated members of his own party over another unrelated matter and some senators
voted in favor of Chase as political retaliation. See generally WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST,
GRAND INQUESTS: THE HISTORIC IMPEACHMENTS OF JUSTICE SAMUEL CHASE AND
PRESIDENT ANDREW JOHNSON 106-13 (1992) (discussing the impeachment of Justice
Chase and possible explanations for his acquittal).
12. The Warren Court spanned from 1953 to 1969. See, e.g., ABRAHAM, supra note 9,
at 189.
13. See Sch. Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370
U.S. 421 (1962).
14. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
15. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
16. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
17. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
18. The Burger Court spanned from 1969 to 1986. See, e.g., ABRAHAM, supra note 9, at
251.
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the policy preferences of "unrepresentative, unelected, politically
unaccountable judges."19 To the liberals, these were decisions that
protected the values and principles at the core of the Constitu-
tion.2' The two sides have been talking past each other ever since.
Although the Warren Court, and to an even greater extent the
Burger Court, were led by Republican appointees, it was the Re-
publicans that began the process of attempting to undo the War-
ren Court legacy. Their method was direct-appoint conserva-
tives to the bench who would reverse the Warren and Burger
Court decisions that they believed to be illegitimate.2' At the
same time, the Democrats began to mobilize their defenses believ-
ing that the Warren and Burger Court decisions were constitu-
tionally correct and the conservative attack upon them mis-
guided.22 The Democrats also believed that Republican efforts to
use judicial appointments to achieve certain results were them-
selves problematic. 23 After all, whatever one says about the War-
ren Court, its Justices were not appointed by presidents intent
upon reaching specific results. The Warren Court decisions were
products of the independent legal reasoning of its Justices (many
of them Republican) and not the implementation of a particular
president's political agenda.24 Thus, the Democrats reasoned, if
the effectuation of ideological change was the purpose behind a
president's judicial nominees, then resistance to that ideology
could properly be used in support of opposition to that nominee.
The culmination of all this, of course, was the fight over the nomi-
nation of Robert Bork; a battle whose scars, as some of the other
panelists in this Symposium attest, have yet to heal.26
19. Jones, supra note 1, at 835.
20. See, e.g., ARCHIBALD Cox, THE COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 179 (1987); see also
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, GOD SAVE THIS HONORABLE COURT: HOW THE CHOICE OF SUPREME
COURT JUSTICES SHAPES OUR HISTORY 3-40 (1985).
21. See, e.g., HERMAN SCHWARTZ, PACKING THE COURTS: THE CONSERVATIVE
CAMPAIGN TO REWRITE THE CONSTITUTION 3-9 (1988). See generally ABRAHAM, supra note
9, at 291-315 (describing the efforts of Presidents Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush
to fill the Supreme Court of the United States with conservatives).
22. See, e.g., ABRAHAM, supra note 9, at 298; SCHWARTZ, supra note 21, at 74-102.
23. See, e.g., ABRAHAM, supra note 9, at 297-98.
24. See, e.g., SCHWARTZ, supra note 21, at 3-4, 8-9.
25. See, e.g., ABRAHAM, supra note 9, at 297-98, 306, 309; SCHWARTZ, supra note 21,
at 76-77.
26. See generally Gary L. McDowell, Bork Was the Beginning: Constitutional Moral-
ism and the Politics of Federal Judicial Selection, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 809, 809-14 (2005);
Charles Cooper, Remarks at the Allen Chair Symposium: Federal Judicial Selection, The
2005]
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The Democrats, as it turned out, were quite correct in thinking
that the Republicans were appointing persons like Robert Bork to
achieve political results. Indeed, the Republicans were explicit
about this intent. As Professor Dawn Johnsen has documented, in
the late 1980s the Reagan-Meese Justice Department prepared a
series of memoranda calling for judicial results to be effectuated
by the appointment of conservative judges. The memoranda
identified specific areas of constitutional law as needing a sub-
stantial overhaul, and deemed appointing judges with specific
ideology as the way to get there.28 In the words of the Justice De-
partment memorandum, "[tihere are few factors that are more
critical to determining the course of the nation, and yet more of-
ten overlooked, than the values and philosophies of the men and
women who populate the third co-equal branch of the national
government-the federal judiciary."'29
The Clinton years saw their own form of ideological strife. In
an effort to minimize opposition, President Clinton consulted with
key Republicans before formally sending his nominations to Con-
gress.3° As a result, and much to the chagrin of his supporters,
Clinton tended to pick judicial moderates rather than candidates
with controversial records.3' In fact, President Clinton's judicial
nominations priorities rested with increasing the ethnic and gen-
der diversity of the courts as much as anything else.32 Neverthe-
First Two Centuries (Apr. 16, 2004), at http://law.richmond.edu/news/media.htm (last vis-
ited Jan. 21, 2005) (the relevant portion of Mr. Cooper's presentation begins at 00:41:47 of
the online video).
27. Dawn E. Johnsen, Ronald Reagan and the Rehnquist Court on Congressional
Power: Presidential Influences on Constitutional Change, 78 IND. L.J. 363, 397-98 (2003).
As a factual matter, it should be noted that the Reagan-Meese documents were not com-
pleted at the time of the Bork nomination. Compare ABRAHAM, supra note 9, at 297 (not-
ing that Bork's nomination was announced in July 1987), with Johnsen, supra, at 397
(noting that the Reagan-Meese documents were issued in 1988).
28. Johnsen, supra note 27, at 397.
29. Id. (quoting OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE YEAR 2000: CHOICES AHEAD IN CONSTI-
TUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, at v (1988)).
30. See MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS: A CONSTITU-
TIONAL AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 122 (2000).
31. See id.
32. Id. at 131; see also ABRAHAM, supra note 9, at 316-17 (quoting President Clinton
as saying "I would appoint to the federal bench only men and women of unquestioned in-
tellect, judicial temperament, broad experience.... I believe that public confidence in our
federal judiciary is furthered by the presence of more women lawyers and more minority
lawyers on the bench, and the judicial system and the country benefit from having judges
who are excellent lawyers with diverse experience").
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less, although Clinton's nominees had the highest percentage of
"well-qualified" ratings by the American Bar Association ("ABA")
in history,33 the Republicans nevertheless prevented many quali-
fied Clinton nominees from reaching the bench.34
The tactics used to frustrate President Clinton's nominations
were less overt, but certainly more effective, than the filibuster
techniques the Democrats have used to fight some of President
Bush's nominees.35 Rather than debating the merits of the Clin-
ton judges, the Republican Congress simply refused to give hear-
ings to many of Clinton's appointees.3 6 The result was that some
of Clinton's nominations were defeated simply by the passage of
time, without public debate or attendant publicity. Many of those
33. GERHARDT, supra note 30, at 120. Some observers contend that the ABA ratings
reflect an ideological bias. See Jones, supra note 1, at 839-40; see also James Lindgren,
Examining the American Bar Association's Ratings of Nominees to the U.S. Courts of Ap-
peals for Political Bias, 1989-2000, 17 J.L. & POL. 1, 28-30 (2001). Other studies suggest,
however, that the data shows no statistically significant difference in the ratings of Clin-
ton versus Bush judges. See Michael J. Saks & Neil Vidmar, A Flawed Search for Bias in
the American Bar Association's Ratings of Prospective Judicial Nominees: A Critique of the
Lindgren Study, 17 J.L. & POL. 219, 252 (2001).
34. Bush Vows to Stick with Judicial Picks, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Nov. 14, 2003, at
A16 (noting that Senate Republicans blocked sixty-three of President Clinton's judicial
nominees).
35. See, e.g., Jones, supra note 1, at 840. See generally Sheldon Goldman, Judicial
Confirmation Wars: Ideology and the Battle for the Federal Courts, 39 U. RICH. L. REV.
871, 898 (2005) (discussing how "Republican obstructionism kept open vacancies that the
Clinton Administration, by right, should have filled"); Sheldon Goldman, Unpicking
Pickering in 2002: Some Thoughts on the Politics of Lower Federal Court Selection and
Confirmation, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 695, 716 (2003) (discussing Republican obstruction of
President Clinton's judicial nominees).
36. Jones, supra note 1, at 840. Judge Jones argues that the Republicans during the
Clinton years did not engage in tactics that "besmirched the candidates' reputations nor
waged open warfare on their judicial philosophy." Id. In fact they did. For example, when
Justice Ronnie White of the Supreme Court of Missouri was up for Senate confirmation for
a federal district judgeship, he faced a vicious and unsubstantiated attack of his views on
criminal law issues by then Senator John Ashcroft. See GERHARDT, supra note 30, at 141,
363 n.16 (discussing White's rejection and attributing it to his alleged "procriminal" atti-
tude); Tracey E. George, Judicial Independence and the Ambiguity of Article III Protec-
tions, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 221, 235-36 n.63 (2003) (discussing White's rejection and quoting
Ashcroft's accusation that Judge White "has a tremendous bent toward criminal activity");
Ronald J. Tabak, Why an Independent Appointing Authority is Necessary to Choose Coun-
sel for Indigent People in Capital Punishment Cases, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1105, 1110 (2003)
(discussing Ashcroft's role in White's rejection); Editorial, A Sad Judicial Mugging, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 8, 1999, at A26 (discussing White's rejection and how Ashcroft incorrectly de-
picted Judge White as "pro-criminal and activist," largely for political reasons). Of course,
the Republicans did avoid publicly attacking the reputations of some of the nominees they
opposed, but it was not because of chivalry. Because they never provided hearings, com-
mittee votes, or floor votes to the appointees, the Republicans never had to officially ar-
ticulate their basis of opposition.
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whose nominations were never completed are among the most
qualified and distinguished lawyers in the country. Elena Kagan,
currently the Dean of the Harvard Law School, was never given a
hearing for her nomination to the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit. 7 Helen White waited four
years and still never received a hearing on her nomination to the
Sixth Circuit. Kathleen McCree Lewis39 and Kent Markus °
were also never given hearings for their nominations to the Sixth
Circuit. Enrique Moreno was denied a hearing for a Fifth Circuit
seat." Allen Snyder's nomination to the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit never made it out of committee,42 and the list goes on.
Numbers, moreover, do not tell the whole story. Because of
their leverage in denying hearings or floor votes, Republicans
were able to insert some of their own candidates into the ap-
pointments process. Conservative jurist Ted Stewart of Utah, for
example, was appointed by President Clinton in order to secure
cooperation in the nominations process from Senator Orrin
Hatch. The selection of Judge Silverman to the Ninth Circuit
was heavily influenced by the intervention of conservative Repub-
lican Senator John Kyl." Given this history, it is a wonder that
the Democratic senators have been as pliant as they are with re-
spect to the Bush nominees.4 After all, to the Democrats, many of
37. See Michael J. Gerhardt, Here's What Less Experience Gets You, WASH. POST, Mar.
2, 2003, at B1.
38. See id.
39. Norman Sinclair, Partisan Spat Leaves 6th Circuit Court Short; Dems Levin, Sta-
benow Oppose Nomination of Republican Picks to Fill 4 Judge Vacancies, DETROIT NEWS,
June 27, 2004, at lB.
40. Jack Torry, Sutton, Cook Being Judged in a Dysfunctional Process, COLUMBUS
DISPATCH, Feb. 5, 2003, at 11A.
41. See Editorial, Your Turn; Focus: Politics, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Sept. 14,
2003, at 4H.
42. See Mike O'Callaghan, So Where is the Crisis?, LAS VEGAS SUN, Nov. 14, 2003, at
A27.
43. Michael J. Gerhardt, Judicial Selection as War, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 667, 683
(2003) (describing how President Clinton and Senator Hatch "choreographed an exchange"
where "President Clinton agreed to begin the vetting process for nominating Stewart,
while Hatch agreed that as long as Stewart continued to progress through the appoint-
ments process, he would initiate hearings on some pending nominations").
44. Carl Tobias, Filling the Federal Appellate Openings on the 9th Circuit, 19 REV.
LITIG. 233, 256 (2000).
45. As of October 2004, "[t]he Senate has confirmed 201 of President Bush's judicial
nominations, including 35 to the circuit courts"-more confirmed nominations "than the
per-term average for Presidents Clinton, Bush I or Reagan." Alliance for Justice Status
Report on Judicial Nominations, U.S. NEWSWIRE, Oct. 14, 2004. To date, the Democrats
have blocked only ten of President Bush's nominees. Id. For a detailed list of the filibus-
[Vol. 39:819
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the vacancies to which President Bush has made nominations
should have been filled with Clinton appointees.46 Meanwhile, for
the most part, President Bush has failed to consult across the
aisle regarding any part of the nominations process. It has not
worked as an effective strategy to foster cooperation.
Bush v. Gore,47 of course, also worked to fan the fire. Whatever
one feels about the merits of that case, there is no question that
the decision sent a powerful message to the nation's political ac-
tors: Federal courts do more than decide abstract legal issues-
tered nominees, see http://www.independentjudiciary.com/nominees/index.cfm?Category
ID=8 (last visited Nov. 29, 2004).
46. In his remarks during this Symposium, Charles Cooper suggested that the De-
mocrats have been hypocritical in delaying some Bush nominations after criticizing the
Republicans for delaying Clinton's appointments. See Charles Cooper, Remarks at the Al-
len Chair Symposium: Federal Judicial Selection, The First Two Centuries (Apr. 16, 2004),
at http://law.richmond.edu/news/media.htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2005) (the relevant por-
tion of Mr. Cooper's presentation begins at 00:45:52 of the online video) (comparing state-
ments of Senators Leahy, Kennedy, and Daschle regarding their prior refusal to allow fili-
busters of judicial nominees with their current support of such filibusters). In this respect,
it is equally significant to note how leading Republicans have also changed their views on
judicial selection dependent upon who held the presidency. In addressing the Senate's de-
lays during President Clinton's tenure, Senator Orrin Hatch took the position that "delay
on confirmation hearings is routine, not an indication of obstruction." Brian Blomquist,
Lott Won't Use Rulings to Topple Federal Judges, WASH. TIMES (D.C.), Mar. 18, 1997, at
A4. Alter President Bush took office, however, Senator Hatch told a different tale: "I think
what's happening here is, is that there's a tremendous desire to delay and delay and delay
and delay.... That's just not right and, frankly, we've got to do something about it." News
Conference with Republican Senators, FED. NEWS SERV., Apr. 12, 2002. Senator Hatch was
also quoted during Clinton's tenure as saying that "[tihere is no vacancy crisis, and a little
perspective clearly belies the assertion that 103 vacancies represent a systematic crisis."
Greg Pierce, Inside Politics: No Crisis, WASH. TIMES (D.C.), Sept. 8, 1997, at A10. When
the appointment power was in Bush's hands, however, Senator Hatch told a different
story: "We're reaching a crisis in our federal courts. We still have 88 vacancies." James W.
Brosnan, Judicial View from Other End of Telescope, COM. APPEAL (Memphis, Tenn.), May
13, 2002, at B5.
Of similar interest are the statements of then Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott. When
the judicial nominees were Clinton appointees, Senator Lott took the position that: "There
are not a lot of people saying: Give us more federal judges ... getting more federal judges
is not what I came here to do." Editorial, A Vote for All the Judges, WASH. POST, Sept. 23,
1999, at A28. When the nominees were those of President Bush, however, he presented a
different position: "'Holding hearings and votes on judicial nominees is arguably the most
important responsibility' of the panel." Susan Milligan, Pickering Rejection Sets Off Nomi-
nee War, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 16, 2002, at Al. Similarly when asked in 1997 about
whether the slow movement of Clinton judges by the Republicans was deliberate, Senator
Lott replied: "[S]ounds like a good idea to me.'" Editorial, Delayed and Denied, N.J. LAW:
WKLY NEWSPAPER, May 14, 2001, at 6. Yet only nine months after President George W.
Bush took office, Senator Lott was already claiming that the Senate was "'at its lowest
confirmation rate of federal judges in recent history, and we need to pick up the pace im-
mediately.'" Donald Lambro, Moment of Decision for Law Enforcement, WASH. TIMES
(D.C.), Oct. 22, 2001, at A18.
47. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
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they have the power to declare who will be the President of the
United States. No other example of the Court's power-except
perhaps a decision on who controls Congress-could be expected
to resound so deeply. The stakes in judicial selection, in short,
were raised once again. That the relevant political actors have
approached judicial selection matters with increased intensity
since Bush v. Gore should therefore not be surprising.
To some, this history is irrelevant. To some, the issue is not
about the questionable tactics employed by either, or both sides,
in the judicial nominations battles; rather, the issue is the proper
role of the judiciary in constitutional decision-making. As Judge
Jones states, "'The problems of judicial selection ... are not so
much a cause as a symptom of the deeper division in views as to
what constitutes the rule of law."'48 The appropriate role of
judges, she argues, is to interpret the law and not to seek to effec-
tuate social change.49 Professor Gary McDowell echoes this point
in his description of conservatives, such as Robert Bork, as being
committed to true constitutional interpretation rather than the
political expediency of the moment.5 ° Such comments reflect two
themes often claimed by judicial conservatives. First, they argue
that conservative jurisprudence stands for the proposition that
effectuating social change is properly in the province of the
elected branches and not the judiciary, and that judicial power,
therefore, must be exercised with considerable restraint.51 Second
they contend that conservative jurisprudence is marked by a
commitment to enduring principle and judicial restraint, while
liberal "activist" jurisprudence, in contrast, does little more than
manipulate text, precedent, history, and doctrine to achieve de-
sired results.5
There is a major problem, however, in the conservative ac-
count: it is not accurate. To demonstrate this point one need only
look to the opinions of Justices Scalia and Thomas, the Justices
whom the Bush Administration cites as the models of the type of
48. Jones, supra note 1, at 846 (quoting Judge Edith H. Jones, Foreword to Sympo-
sium: The Ethics of Judicial Selection, 43 S. TEX. L. REV. 1, 6 (2001)).
49. Id.
50. McDowell, supra note 26, at 810.
51. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 211
(1985); J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Why Conservative Jurisprudence Is Compassionate, 89 VA.
L. REV. 753, 762 (2003).
52. See Wilkinson, supra note 51, at 762.
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"strict constructionists" that they intend to nominate to the fed-
eral bench.53 Whatever else they may be, Justices Scalia and
Thomas are not exemplars of judicial restraint. Rather, they have
been among the most active Justices in history in striking down-
or voting to strike down-federal legislation.54 Even more reveal-
ing is their record in cases where the elected branches have acted
precisely as the conservative model would have it-i.e., when po-
litically accountable officials have acted to promote social
change.55 Their record in this area is clearly not one of defer-
ence.56 For example, Justices Scalia and Thomas have voted to
strike down federal affirmative action provisions,5" state affirma-
tive action plans,5" measures designed to promote minority own-
ership of media,59 campaign finance legislation that attempts to
redress wealth inequities in the political process,6" portions of the
Americans with Disabilities Act,6' part of the Family and Medical
Leave Act,62 legislative attempts to promote minority representa-
tion,63 laws protecting women from violence,64 and laws protecting
gays,65 the aged, 66 and the disabled from discrimination.67 They
have found constitutional violations in the actions of local com-
munities seeking to protect their citizens from flooding,68 conges-
53. See Elisabeth Bumiller, Bush Vows to Seek Conservative Judges, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
29, 2002, at A24.
54. See infra notes 57-72 and accompanying text.
55. See infra notes 57-72 and accompanying text.
56. See infra notes 57-72 and accompanying text.
57. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 239 (1995) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring); id. at 240-41 (Thomas, J., concurring).
58. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 346-49 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part); id. at 349-78 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
59. See Adarand Constructors, 515 U.S. at 239 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 240-41
(Thomas, J., concurring).
60. See McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 247-64 (2003) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 264-86 (Thomas, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
61. See Tennessee v. Lane, 124 S. Ct. 1978, 2007-13 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting); id.
at 2013 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356
(2001).
62. See Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 741-44 (2003) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); id. at 744-59 (Kennedy, J., joined by Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
63. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
64. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
65. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
66. See Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
67. See Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. ofAla. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
68. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
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tion,69 and environmental damage. 7' They have even argued that
the efforts of all fifty states to fund legal services for the poor by
using the interest from a pooled account of lawyers' trust funds
which could not earn interest for their owners, 1 was nevertheless
an unconstitutional taking even though the owners suffered no
economic loss.72
This is not the track record of a jurisprudence that believes
that judges should not effectuate political results. As such, it is
only natural that Democrats would oppose conservative judicial
nominees avowedly appointed in the model of Justices Scalia and
Thomas. After all, the conservative Justices have already made
clear that they are fully willing to invalidate any number of De-
mocratic-supported measures and the Democrats, one would sus-
pect, would be motivated to have their legislative and policy gains
upheld.
The conservative judges response to all this, presumably, is
that their strict adherence to the rule of law demands these re-
sults. The fact that their decisions can be characterized as politi-
cally conservative is simply a fortuitous or unfortunate by-
product, depending upon one's political beliefs, of dispassionate
legal reasoning. Again, however, the record belies the claim. The
opinions of the so-called strict constructionist judges make clear
that judicial conservatives are more than willing to engage in "ac-
tivist" decision-making, including foregoing so-called originalist
analysis,73 when the results so require.
Let me briefly offer some examples.74 When Justice Scalia could
not find any constitutional provision that would limit the ability
of local communities to protect citizens from environmental
harms, he based his decision on something he called "constitu-
69. See id.
70. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
71. Such funds would include those of insubstantial amounts, those held for short pe-
riods of time, and/or other such funds in which the costs of administering the account
would exceed any interest earned to the client. Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S.
216, 223-24 (2003).
72. See id. at 241-52 (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., Kennedy, & Thomas, JJ.,
dissenting).
73. See Lino A. Graglia, How the Constitution Disappeared, in INTERPRETING THE
CONSTITUTION: THE DEBATE OVER ORIGINAL INTENT 35, 42 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1990); see
also Jones, supra note 1, at 837.
74. For a more detailed presentation of this argument, see William P. Marshall, Con-
servatives and the Seven Sins of Judicial Activism, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1217 (2002).
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tional culture."75 Although Justice Thomas could find no textual
basis protecting the states from being sued in front of federal ad-
ministrative agencies, he found the states immune from suit
anyway.76 In the sovereign immunity cases, the conservatives re-
lied on history when they could find no constitutional text sup-
porting their positions. 77 In state affirmative action cases, they re-
lied on text when they could find no history.78 In federal
affirmative action cases they relied on neither text nor history on
account that neither could support their position. 79 The conserva-
tive position on so-called originalism, ° in short, is that it is a ju-
dicial tool of convenience and not one of restraint.81
In fact, the evidence against the conservative's claim that
theirs is the true "rule of law" jurisprudence is overwhelming.
Time and time again they have been willing to manipulate not
only their applications of originalism but also their views on def-
erence to elected officials, judicial restraint, and judicial power in
order to accomplish specific results. In cases where the state has
75. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1028.
76. See Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 751-67 (2002).
77. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 760 (1999) (noting that "history" provides
sufficient rationale for affirming the State's immunity from suit in federal court).
78. See, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action, 107 YALE L.J. 427, 429-32 (1997) (dis-
cussing the constitutionality of affirmative action and how Justices Scalia and Thomas
apply a literal reading of the Constitution to reject affirmative action); Stephen A. Siegel,
The Federal Government's Power to Enact Color-Conscious Laws: An Originalist Inquiry,
92 Nw. U. L. REV. 477 (1998) (analyzing the constitutionality of affirmative action pro-
grams).
79. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (overruling in
part Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990)).
80. The use of originalism in constitutional interpretation can be subject to serious
criticism, not the least of which is that it is not clear that a group of individuals as vision-
ary as the Framers would have wanted their specific views to be the canons that decide
questions in a world with issues and problems that they could not even begin to anticipate.
Indeed it is just as likely that in their use of such general terms as "due process" and
"privileges and immunities," that they wanted the Constitution to be subject to ongoing
interpretation. For a particularly excellent discussion of the originalism debate, see H. Jef-
ferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885
(1985). See also RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMP-
TION OF LIBERTY 89-117 (2004) (analyzing originalism as a form of constitutional interpre-
tation); Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND.
L. REV. 1 (1971) (arguing that the Constitution should be interpreted according to the
original intentions of its framers); Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for Original Under-
standing, 60 B. U. L. REV. 204 (1980) (arguing throughout that orginalism is not a tenable
approach to constitutional decision-making).
81. Occasionally the conservatives employ a seemingly originalist method in reaching
a decision that is not easily characterized as politically conservative. See, e.g., Kyllo v.
United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (holding that the use of a heat measuring device in a
drug investigation constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment).
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disfavored gays, for example, they call for deference to the deci-
sions of the political majority, 82 but in cases where the state has
acted to protect gays they refuse to defer." They restrict judicial
standing when the plaintiffs are low-income, minority, or other-
wise disenfranchised84 or when the plaintiffs sue to remedy envi-
ronmental harms,85 but they find broad standing available when
the plaintiffs are white persons challenging affirmative action,86
majority-minority redistricting plans,8 or when the plaintiffs rep-
resent commercial interests contesting government efforts to pre-
serve the environment.88 The conservatives criticize the "readi-
ness" of Supreme Court moderates to ignore stare decisis in
overturning the seventeen-year-old precedent of Bowers v. Hard-
wick 89 in Lawrence v. Texas;9 ° but in Payne v. Tennessee,91 Justice
Scalia92 voted to overturn two decisions of only two93 and four94
years and to allow the prosecution to introduce victim impact
statements in capital cases. Again, the list goes on.95
82. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 589 (2003) (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist,
C.J., & Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that states should be permitted to ban private
consensual conduct based on the "ancient proposition that a governing majority's belief
that certain sexual behavior is 'immoral and unacceptable' constitutes a rational basis for
regulation"); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 648 (1996) (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist,
C.J., & Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that deference should be given to the political ma-
jority in permitting states to regulate their "sexual morality statewide").
83. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
84. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 355 (1996); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984);
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
85. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 198-215
(2000) (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., dissenting).
86. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 224 (1995).
87. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 630 (1993).
88. See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997). For a thorough account of how the
Court's standing doctrine has tended to favor privileged over marginalized interests, see
Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Standing for Privilege: The Failure of Injury Analysis, 82 B.U. L. REV.
301 (2002).
89. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
90. 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (affirming the rights of adults to engage in private consensual
conduct).
91. 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
92. Justice Thomas was not yet on the Supreme Court when Payne v. Tennessee was
decided on June 27, 1991. See ABRAHAM, supra note 9, at 313 (noting that Justice Thomas
was confirmed by the Senate on November 15, 1991 and was sworn in three days later on
November 18, 1991).
93. South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 (1989), overruled by Payne v. Tennessee,
501 U.S. 808, 828-30 (1991).
94. Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987), overruled by Payne v. Tennessee, 501
U.S. 808, 828-30 (1991).
95. For example, although conservatives, including Robert Bork, have widely ridiculed
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The point of this should be clear. The conservative attempt to
proclaim their jurisprudence of a higher constitutional order is
simply untenable.96 The so-called strict constructionists have
more than demonstrated that they will deviate from high princi-
Justice Douglas's use of the term "penumbral rights" in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 485 (1965)-the case that provides the primary doctrinal foundation for Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973)-it was Justice Scalia who, in Employment Division v. Smith, 494
U.S. 872 (1990), coined the term "hybrid rights." Smith, 494 U.S. at 882. See generally
ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 95-
100 (1990) (discussing Griswold v. Connecticut and the origins of the right to privacy).
96. The greater claim to jurisprudential legitimacy may in fact belong to the liberals.
Over sixty years ago, the Supreme Court noted, in United States v. Carolene Products Co.,
304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4. (1938), that judicial power was to be used sparingly and that
courts should generally defer to the decision of politically accountable actors. At the same
time, the Court made clear that courts should be vigilant in reviewing state actions that
adversely affect minority groups (who do not have the political power to protect them-
selves from disfavored treatment) or state actions that affect the integrity of the political
process itself. Id.
The Carolene Products formulation is a good one. In a democracy, the role of an un-
elected judiciary should be limited in order to respect majority will; however, it is also sen-
sible that courts should step in when the political processes themselves cannot be expected
to be fair. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
75-77 (1980) (analyzing the famous Carolene Products footnote four). According to John
Hart Ely:
[footnote four of Carolene Products] suggests that it is an appropriate func-
tion of the Court to keep the machinery of democratic government running as
it should, to make sure the channels of political participation and communi-
cation are kept open .... the Court should also concern itself with what ma-
jorities do to minorities, particularly ... laws "directed at" religious, national,
and racial minorities and those infected by prejudice against them.
ELY, supra, at 76.
Since Carolene Products, liberal jurisprudence, by and large, has stayed true to this gen-
eral theme. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Rela-
tion to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375 (1985) (discussing how Roe v. Wade fits within the
Carolene Products formulation). But see John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf A
Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L. J. 920, 933-37 (1973) (arguing that Roe does not fit
within the Carolene Products model).
Conservative jurisprudence, on the other hand, has turned Carolene Products on its
head. In case after case, conservative decisions have reinforced the rights of the already
established, against the interests of the disaffected. They have protected white majorities
against laws that would assist minorities. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 346-49
(2003) (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at
349-78 (Thomas, J., joined by Scalia, J., as to Parts I-VII, concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); Shaw v. Reno, 509
U.S. 630 (1990). They have protected heterosexuals from laws that would help homosexu-
als. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000). They have voted to strike down
state efforts that would provide the poor with the legal assistance necessary to challenge
more entrenched economic interests. See Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216,
241-52 (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., Kennedy, & Thomas, JJ., dissenting). Yet,
while it makes sense to protect political minorities from political majorities, protecting po-
litical majorities from themselves makes little sense at all.
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ple when necessary to further their own political vision.9" Presi-
dent Bush's call to place strict constructionists on the bench,
thus, can only be understood as a call for the implementation of
that political vision (with its attendant set of specific constitu-
tional results) and not for the furtherance of a principled consti-
tutional order.
None of this, of course, is conducive to de-escalating the battles
over judicial nominations. The President's opponents, after all,
cannot be fairly criticized if they respond politically to the Presi-
dent's political agenda--even if he advances that agenda under a
judicial nominations rubric. The end of the nominations battles, I
suggest, will only occur when both sides work to achieve some
measure of bipartisanship. Certainly, any president's judicial
nominations are entitled to deference from Congress. At the same
time, any president should expect opposition when his judicial
nominations are a part of political strategy designed to achieve
partisan goals.
97. As I have said elsewhere:
[T]he conservative Justices show little hesitance in doing exactly what they
condemn when it serves their agenda. They seek favored constitutional status
for their own chosen constituencies even though they assert that exercising
judicial power to effectuate social policy is illegitimate. They strike down,
rather than defer to, legislative attempts to alleviate societal disparities in
wealth and power even though they claim that redressing social inequities is
in the province of the legislature.
William P. Marshall, The Empty Promise of Compassionate Conservatism: A Reply to
Judge Wilkinson, 90 VA. L. REV. 355, 375 (2004).
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